On March 7, 1953, a communiqué was issued in Washington that the U.S. government considered the February 20, 1953 proposals to be fair, reasonable and consistent with the principle of oil nationalization, but on March 20, it gave a radio address in which it rejected the February 20 proposals. As a last resort, he wrote to President Eisenhower, who followed Truman, asking for financial assistance. Eisenhower`s response came in a letter Henderson sent to Moaddeq on July 3. In that letter, Eisenhower rejected Moaddeq`s request for assistance on the grounds that it would not be fair to spend U.S. taxpayers` money to help Iran, which could have access to funds from the sale of oil if a reasonable agreement was reached on compensation. This letter finally sealed the door to negotiations with Moaddeq (Bamberg, 473-87). Dr. Moaddeq`s inability to resolve the oil dispute coincided with a serious deterioration in economic conditions and a deterioration of the domestic political situation in Iran. After the dispute between the two countries was resumed in The Hague, the Czech Foreign Minister, appointed mediator, approached the case so that the litigants could try to resolve the dispute. Ironically, Reza Shah, who had called for the abolition of D`Arcy`s concession, suddenly conceded to the British demands, much to the dismay and disappointment of his cabinet. A new agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was reached after Cadman`s visit to Iran in April 1933 and a private hearing with the Shah.
A new agreement was ratified by the National Consultative Assembly on 28 May 1933 and received the king`s approval the following day. The 1933 agreement contained a number of provisions that germinated the controversies and disputes to come between the two parties. One of the main criticisms on the Iranian side was the extension of the oil concession to the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) from 1961 to 1993, or 32 years. This extension appears to have been made to encourage AIOC to invest more in the development of its oil activities in Iran. However, in the years to come, and after the abdication of Reza Shah, this extension was strongly condemned by Iranian politicians as a liquidation of Iranian interests. The 1954 Oil Agreement Consortium. With the formation of the Zehedi government, the scene of the return of Iranian oil to production and the world market was set up. But how should this be done? Of course, the AIOC was paralyzed. If it took the lead, only nationalist fires in Iran would be unleashed.
Obviously, the U.S. government should lead the way in an oil settlement. The U.S. State Department retained Herbert Hoover Jr. as special representative of the Secretary of State for Dulles to explore the possibility of creating a new consortium of oil companies to reflect AIOC`s interests. In the Iranian case, the U.S. government renounced its anti-trust laws and subsequently the Anglo-American intercompany talks ended with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on April 9, 1954. The memorandum provided for the establishment of a consortium in which the shares were to be 40 per cent for AIOC (amended in December 1954 in British Petroleum Company); 14 per cent for Royal Dutch-Shell; 8% each for the five U.S. companies Standard Oil (NJ), Socony, Socal, Texas and Gulf; and 6% for the French Oil Company (PCP).